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MANAGING THE RISKS OF SHALE GAS
DEVELOPMENT USING INNOVATIVE LEGAL
AND REGULATORY APPROACHES
SHEILA OLMSTEAD & NATHAN RICHARDSON*
ABSTRACT
Booming production of oil and gas from shale enabled by hydraulic fracturing technology has led to tension between hoped-for economic
benefits and feared environmental and other costs, with great associated
controversy. Studies of how policy can best react to these challenges and
how it can balance risk and reward have focused on prescriptive regulatory responses and, to a somewhat lesser extent, voluntary industry best
practices. While there is undoubtedly room for improved regulation, innovative tools are relatively understudied. The liability system predates
environmental regulation yet still plays an important—and in some senses
predominant—role. Changes to that system, including burden-shifting rules
and increased bond requirements, might improve outcomes. Similarly,
new regulation can and should incorporate modern understanding of the
benefits of market-based approaches. Information disclosure requirements
can benefit the liability system and have independent benefits of their own.
Policymakers faced with a need for policy change in reaction to shale development should carefully consider alternatives to regulation and, when
regulation is deemed necessary, consider which tool is best suited.
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INTRODUCTION
Shale gas development is increasing rapidly in the United States;1
natural gas extracted from deep shale reached about one-quarter of US
production by 2010 and may comprise half or more of US production by
2040.2 Operators now can exploit these resources cost-effectively due to
advances in two critical technologies: hydraulic fracturing and horizontal
drilling. The use of these technologies to extract gas from deep shale formations has generated significant economic benefits, but it also has raised
concerns about associated risks to the environment and human health.3
The wide distribution of shale plays means that many are being
developed in states, such as Texas and Oklahoma, with rich histories of
oil and gas exploitation and regulation, and others in states such as Ohio
and Pennsylvania with little such history.4 States have long been the primary regulators of oil and gas development and have retained that role
as production has expanded, though both federal and local authorities play
some role.5 The regulatory framework for managing risks from shale gas
development is accordingly highly dynamic.
Flexible, innovative legal and regulatory approaches hold great
promise as cost-effective alternatives to prescriptive regulation, but it remains to be seen whether they are appropriate for managing shale gas

1

See NATHAN RICHARDSON ET AL., THE STATE OF STATE SHALE GAS REGULATION 1, 3 (2013),
available at http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/RFF-Rpt-StateofStateRegs_Report.pdf.
2
U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 MT-23
(2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2014).pdf.
3
See, e.g., ALAN KRUPNICK ET AL., PATHWAYS TO DIALOGUE: WHAT THE EXPERTS SAY
ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS OF SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT (2013), available at
http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-Rpt-PathwaystoDialogue_FullReport.pdf.
4
See RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 3–4.
5
Id. at 5–6.
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risks. This paper examines two main categories of innovative approaches
that can be used to regulate environmental risks: liability rules and
market-based regulations. For each approach, we discuss theoretical
advantages and disadvantages, and we explore actual and potential
applications for the regulation of risks from shale gas development.
I.

LIABILITY RULES

Virtually all public discussion of the risks of shale development
centers on the proper role for regulation: which risks need to be regulated
and how stringent should that regulation be?6 Nevertheless, liability, not
regulation, is probably the most important driver of operator practices
aimed at reducing risks—and this likely would remain the case under
even the most ambitious proposals for more extensive regulation.
Large areas of drilling-related activity are unregulated or only
lightly regulated, like drilling equipment and, in most states, fracking
fluids.7 Even when state drilling regulations are quite detailed, such as
those aimed at ensuring well integrity, operators retain significant discretion. But operators always face the threat of lawsuit if their activity results in harms to others or to the environment.8 Lawsuits over drilling and
related activities, such as truck accidents, are common.9 Operators therefore have a strong incentive to exercise due care in almost all activities,
regardless of regulation.
This is not to suggest that regulation is not useful and in many
cases necessary, but rather that the two systems—regulation and liability—
work together to shape patterns of behavior and thereby reduce risks. Much
work has been done on the effects of liability rules in the environmental
context, especially on Superfund and related state laws.10 But debates over
6

See Nick Snow, Shale Gas Renaissance Makes Governments Examine Regulatory Roles,
OIL & GAS J. (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.ogj.com/articles/2013/08/shale-gas-renaissance
-makes-governments-examine-regulatory-roles.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4JG7-ZFF2.
7
See Ian Urbina, Regulation Lax as Gas Wells’ Tainted Water Hits Rivers, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/us/27gas.html?pagewanted=all&_r
=0, archived at http://perma.cc/4ZAT-TB3R.
8
See Jennifer Hayes, Note, Protecting Pennsylvania’s Three Rivers’ Water Resources from
Shale Gas Development Impacts, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 385, 388–89, 392–93,
402–03 (2012).
9
See Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV.
729, 734–35, 754–56, 763, 796, 800 (2013).
10
Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Multidefendant Settlements Under Joint
and Several Liability: The Problem of Insolvency, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 517–19 (1994);
Hilary Sigman, Liability Funding and Superfund Cleanup Remedies, 35 J. ENVTL. ECON.
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how best to manage new risks imposed by expanding shale development
have largely missed a consideration of the liability system—and of options
available for improving its ability to manage new risks.
A.

Regulation Versus Liability in General

But how do the two systems work together? When is liability appropriate and adequate, and when is regulation needed instead? Law and
economics scholar Steven Shavell addressed these questions in a landmark article,11 identifying four criteria on which to base an evaluation of
which tool is superior for a particular situation:
•

•

•

Information asymmetry. Where private parties have
greater knowledge about risky activities than prospective regulators, liability is favored over regulation. Regulation without good information is likely
to be too lax or too strict, and courts are usually
better able to determine the required level of care
(and whether it was met) in a particular situation
than are regulators across all actual and possible
situations.12
Ability to pay. If those responsible for harms can
escape liability because they are unable to pay to
remedy those harms, liability will give inadequate
incentives to change behavior.13
Threat of suit. Similarly, if those responsible for
harms can escape liability because they are never
sued at all, liability once again will give inadequate

& MGMT. 205, 205–06 (1998); Howard F. Chang & Hilary Sigman, Incentives to Settle
Under Joint and Several Liability: An Empirical Analysis of Superfund Litigation, 29 J.
LEGAL. STUD. 205, 205–06 (2000); Howard F. Chang & Hilary Sigman, The Effect of Joint
and Several Liability Under Superfund on Brownfields, 27 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 363,
363–64, 382–83 (2007); Anna Alberini & David Austin, Accidents Waiting to Happen:
Liability Policy and Toxic Pollution Releases, 84 REV. ECON. & STAT. 729, 729, 740 (2002).
11
Steven Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15
RAND J. ECON. 271 (1984) [hereinafter Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability
and Safety Regulation].
12
Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF THE LAW SELECTED READINGS, 59, 60–61 (Donald A. Wittman, ed., 2003) [hereinafter
Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety].
13
Id. at 61–62.
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incentives. The best and most relevant example is
activity that creates widely dispersed harms. Victims
may lack standing to sue, ability to organize a class
action, or ability to connect the harm suffered to the
party responsible, for example.14
Costs. Both liability and regulation have costs—
litigation costs on the one hand, and administrative
and enforcement costs on the other.15 Litigation
costs can be very high but are only incurred in the
case of harm, while regulation requires the ongoing
“public expense of maintaining the regulatory establishment” and private compliance costs.16

Shavell observes that in most real-world settings, a mix of liability and regulation is used. He argues that as a general rule, the choice
between the two in a given area seems to reflect these criteria; society
generally, if not always, gets the regulation or liability decision right.17
B.

Regulation Versus Liability in Shale Development

The dichotomy just discussed is probably true in the oil and gas
context as well. For most risks, private parties have better information
than regulators, even sophisticated state-level agencies.18 This points in
favor of a liability system, and, indeed, most operator decisions are made
in the shadow of liability risk.
But other factors point toward regulation. In many cases, operators
have excellent information but potential victims do not, and it is hard for
courts to determine if operators exercised due care.19 An important reason
is the simple fact that activity occurs underground, where only equipment

14

Id. at 62–63.
Id. at 63.
16
Id.
17
See Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, supra note 12, at 68.
18
See Wiseman, supra note 9, at 741.
19
See Charles B. Jimerson & Mark F. Moss, Top 5 Issues in Today’s Hydraulic
Fracturing Litigation, J I M E R S O N & C O B B , P.A. (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://www.jimersoncobb.com/blawg /2013/12/top-5-issues-in-todays-hydraulic-fracturinglitigation/, archived at http://perma .cc/NN87-95WN.
15
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under the control of operators can observe it.20 Another challenge is that
many operators are small independents whose resources may be inadequate
to cover large damage awards.21 Perhaps the strongest factor in favor of
regulating some oil and gas activities is that they may lead to significant
but widely dispersed harms.22 Liability is likely to be an inefficient and impractical means of addressing such problems as fugitive methane emissions, or contamination of rivers and streams with flowback fluids. This
is of course not unique to oil and gas drilling—most environmental regulation can point to dispersed harms as its raison d’être, and in fact one
way of describing the growth of environmental regulation is a response
to an inability of the traditional liability system to address widespread
environmental harms associated with industrial society.
Whether regulation or liability is superior in cost terms for shale
gas risks—or any others—is harder to determine. Shavell struggled somewhat to come up with general principles in his 1984 article, concluding
that, on balance, liability is likely to be less costly.23 This may be true for
many one-off, small scale events but is almost certainly not true when
harms are dispersed because class actions are notoriously complex. Even
allowing for class-action lawsuits, costs of a pure liability approach may
be extremely high.24
In fact, Shavell’s third criterion—threat of suit25—could be viewed
as a special case of his cost pillar. When potential plaintiffs find it difficult to sue, the cause is often the high cost of legal action in the face of
collective action problems or procedural barriers that courts erect to protect against difficult-to-resolve suits. In other cases, inadequate threat
of suit might arise from information asymmetries. If you don’t know who
is polluting your water, you can’t sue.
On the other hand, where information is readily available to private parties and instances of harm are relatively rare compared to the
level of activity, liability is likely to be much less costly than detailed
20

Id.
See generally Sarah M. Forbes, “The United States and China: Moving toward Responsible Shale Gas Development,” BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 2013), available at http://www
.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/2/06%20china%20clean%20energy/uschina%20moving
%20toward%20responsible%20shale%20gas%20development_sforbes.
22
See Urbina, supra note 7; see Hayes, supra note 8, at 391 (stating that over a four-year
period, shale developers used 29 chemicals that are “known or possible human carcinogens”).
23
Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, supra note 12, at 63, 65.
24
Peter S. Menell, The Limitations of Legal Institutions for Addressing Environmental
Risks, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 93–94, 101 (1991).
25
Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, supra note 12, at 61–62.
21
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regulation. Good examples are truck accidents and aboveground damage
to landowners’ property, both of which are generally handled by or negotiated in the shadow of the tort system.
Therefore the intuition that the division of labor, as it were, between liability and regulation follows Shavell’s principles seems to hold
in the oil and gas context just as Shavell asserts it does generally.26 This
is not to say that some activities currently regulated might not be better
handled through liability, or that there is no need for additional regulation
because the current liability system is adequate. Either claim requires
far more evidence than the above anecdotal review could provide.
Nor is it to say that this division of regulatory labor arose by
design. In most cases, regulation is imposed when the liability system
comes to be viewed as inadequately addressing a given risk—usually in
circumstances poorly suited to liability under Shavell’s criteria—not de
novo creation of a new regulatory regime based on a theoretical framework.
One of the liability system’s great virtues is that it is the default—new
activities and technologies are “regulated” by it even if they outpace topdown regulation.
C.

Policy Options for the Shale Liability System

We therefore have a legal system for addressing risks of shale development in which regulation and liability operate in symbiotic parallel,
addressing different risks and harms. Within this system, good principles
exist for deciding whether a given activity is best left to control by liability
or regulation, though decisions in individual cases may be difficult. In broad
terms, the current balance between liability and regulation appears to
follow those principles.
Therefore, rather than fueling already-contentious debates about
whether additional regulation is needed, it is useful to discuss how the existing system for reducing risks can be made more efficient and effective.
Policy options for improving regulation of shale development are widely
discussed, but options for improving the liability system are relatively
underexamined. Given the significance of liability in managing development risks and encouraging exercise of care by operators, this is unfortunate. This section explores some such options, organized broadly around
Shavell’s previously described principles.
26

See Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, supra note
11, at 274–76.
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Information Asymmetry

When private actors have better access to information than regulators, liability is more effective, all else equal.27 But information asymmetry
between private parties can create problems—wrongdoers may escape liability because victims are not aware they have been injured, cannot determine who is responsible, or cannot acquire sufficient evidence to support
their case. Even if this information can be obtained, doing so may be costly.
As we already noted, this is particularly true for disparate harms, like air
and surface water pollution. But even where harms are relatively localized, as in some cases of groundwater or soil contamination, information
is often difficult to locate. Disclosure, burden shifting, and strict liability
can improve the function of the liability system in situations of information asymmetry. Such situations are common in shale development, where
levels of expertise between operators and potential victims differ greatly.
Beneficial changes in firms’ behavior often emerge directly from
disclosure.28 But disclosure also provides information to prospective plaintiffs in legal action. If groundwater is contaminated by specific compounds,
for example, fracking fluid disclosure rules, requirements that firms report
spills and other such accidents, and wastewater transportation tracking
and record-keeping regulations can help victims identify and sue those
responsible for environmental damage. Without such disclosure requirements, it might be difficult or impossible for such litigation to succeed.
Civil discovery can help plaintiffs uncover information but can be costly
for both sides.29
Another approach in cases of information asymmetry is to shift
presumptions or burdens of proof in litigation. For example, most states
require testing of water wells near drilling operations to identify groundwater contamination.30 In contrast, Pennsylvania does not require predrilling water well testing but instead shifts the burden of proof onto
defendant operators if such testing is not done.31 Ordinarily, a plaintiff
27
Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, supra note 11,
at 274–76.
28
Lori S. Bennear & Sheila S. Olmstead, The Impact of the “Right to Know”: Information
Disclosure and the Violation of Drinking Water Standards, 56 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT.
117, 120, 129 (2008).
29
Stephen Yeazell, Getting What We Asked For, Getting What We Paid For, and Not Liking
What We Got: The Vanishing Civil Trial, UCLA PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY SERIES, Oct. 10,
2004, at 6, 8, 12–14.
30
See, e.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE 1501:9-1-02(F) (2014) (requiring sampling of all wells within
300 feet prior to drilling).
31
58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3218 (2012).
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would have to show an operator caused the injury in question to prevail
in litigation. But in Pennsylvania, any contamination is presumed to have
been caused by drilling unless the defendant operator can rebut this presumption with pre-drilling test evidence.32
In most cases, the operator will have better information than potential victims about groundwater quality and other geological and hydrological conditions. Placing the burden of proof on operators therefore likely
reduces litigation-related costs and decreases the chance that a wrongdoer will escape liability because plaintiffs cannot establish causation.
This may be one reason why energy developers in Pennsylvania typically
engage in extensive pre-development groundwater testing at significant
private cost,33 although these data are not publicly available, and postdevelopment testing is only performed in the case of a complaint. Such
burden-shifting approaches may be useful in other contexts in which litigation would be a better, cheaper alternative to regulation, but for information asymmetries.
Perhaps the most common approach to information asymmetry in
litigation is the imposition of strict liability—that is, liability without
regard to whether a defendant has exercised due care. Strict liability is
traditionally applied to “ultra-hazardous” activities, on the basis that such
activities carry a very high duty of care.34 In a few states, oil drilling has
been classed as ultra-hazardous,35 but in others courts handle drilling
under the general negligence standard.36
Contrary to the intuition of many, imposing strict liability theoretically should not result in operators taking additional care.37 But it does
have one important advantage—it simplifies litigation. Plaintiffs may lack
sufficient information to prove a defendant operator failed to exercise due
care, but under strict liability they must only prove they were injured and
that the defendant caused that injury. However, strict liability also affects
activity levels: since those engaged in the activity are subject to greater
32

Id.
PA. STATE UNIV. COLL. OF AGRIC. SCIS. SCHOOL OF FOREST RES., Gas Well Drilling and
Your Private Water Supply, WATER FACTS #28 (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.eesi.psu.edu
/seminars-conferences/earthtalks-spring2009-marcellus-supplements/gasdrilling.pdf.
34
Neal J. Manor, “What the Frack?” Why Hydraulic Fracturing is Abnormally Dangerous
and Whether Courts Should Allow Strict Liability Causes of Action, 4 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC.
& NAT. RESOURCES L. 459, 468–71 (2011–2012).
35
See, e.g., Franks v. Indep. Prod. Co., 96 P.3d 484, 492 (Wyo. 2004) (“Wyoming law recognizes that the drilling of an oil and gas well is an ultrahazardous activity”).
36
See, e.g., Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221, 225–26 (Tex. 1936) (declining to
apply strict liability doctrine to oil drilling).
37
Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7–8, 11 (1980).
33
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liability, at the margin, some will simply choose not to engage in it.38 This
may be a good thing if other factors, such as lack of information on the
part of plaintiffs or the existence of judgment-proof defendants, mean
that activity levels are greater than socially optimal. But if these factors
are not present, strict liability carries a hidden cost.
2.

Ability to Pay

Policymakers have long been aware of problems created by reliance
on the liability system when potential damages exceed the ability of defendants to compensate victims. Oil and gas development is a classic example:
damages from spills or contamination can be great, and many independent
operators have limited resources. Traditional tools for addressing this problem are financial responsibility, insurance requirements, and bonding.
Generally, when an operator applies for a permit to drill a well, it
must show evidence of adequate financial resources or insurance to pay
related claims.39 Operators also may be required to post a bond in association with the permit. For example, Pennsylvania requires operators to
file a bond of $4000 for each well permit.40 Operators in Colorado alternatively can file a “blanket bond” of $25,000 covering all wells in the state.41
Texas requires a similar $25,000 blanket bond for up to ten wells.42
Bonding can reduce the ability of operators with limited resources
to escape liability and therefore increase incentives to take due care to
avoid harms, but only when funded appropriately. An amount of $4000 is
certainly insufficient to cover the expected damages from a serious accident at a well, and since it is far less than any firm’s assets, likely provides
no incentive to take additional care. A $25,000 blanket bond is probably
even less effective since large operators may have thousands of wells.
Stronger financial responsibility requirements can improve the ability of
the liability system to generate adequate incentives for operators.
3.

Threat of Suit

The primary reason operators might expect to escape suit for harms
they cause, and therefore face inadequate incentives to reduce risks, is
the disparate nature of many such harms, such as air and surface water
38

Id.
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FEDERAL FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY DEMONSTRATIONS FOR
OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF CLASS II OIL-AND GAS-RELATED INJECTION WELLS 3–6 (1990),
available at http://www.epa.gov/r5water/uic/forms/ffrdooc2.pdf.
40
58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3225 (2012).
41
2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:703 (2014).
42
TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.1042 (West 2005).
39
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pollution. This is the source of the appeal of much oil and gas regulation,
yet no policy can change the distributed nature of risks from the activity.
Nevertheless, some policy changes can increase the effectiveness
of the liability system. For example, the cost and complexity of pursuing
class-action claims might be reduced for certain kinds of injury related to
shale development. As noted above, information disclosure rules are also
useful in that they enable actual and potential victims to find out about
harms, identify responsible parties, and establish causation in litigation.
4.

Costs

Almost all of the tools and policy options discussed above for resolving information asymmetries, addressing inability to pay, and preventing
operators from escaping liability also help reduce the costs of litigation.
Information disclosure regulations lessen the need to rely on expensive
discovery to acquire information. In theory, burden shifting rules put the
burden of evidence gathering on the party able to meet it at least cost.
Strict liability can greatly simplify cases by eliminating the need to prove
duty of care and breach of that duty.
Other measures to reduce cost include expediting litigation, most
obviously by appointing and funding enough state and federal judges to
manage current and future caseloads. In states and districts with large
amounts of drilling activity and related litigation, specialist courts or dockets might also improve the ability of courts to efficiently handle such cases.
II.

PRESCRIPTIVE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION (OF SHALE
GAS DEVELOPMENT)

Until the 1990s, the standard approach to environmental regulation
was limited to policy instruments that economists call “command-andcontrol” or prescriptive approaches, which regulate behavior or performance
of individual facilities.43 While there are many such approaches, they fall
into two general classes: technology standards and performance standards.
A technology standard requires firms to use a particular pollution
abatement technology. “For example, the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments
required new power plants to install large flue-gas desulfurization devices
(“scrubbers”) to remove sulfur dioxide from stack gases.”44 In the shale
43

U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 4-1 to 4-3
(2010), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0568-50.pdf/$file
/EE-0568-50.pdf.
44
Sheila Olmstead, The Role of Market Incentives in Environmental Policy, in THE OXFORD
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context, technology standards may require a particular type of cement in
well casing. Other types of command-and-control regulations, such as
setback requirements, are similarly uniform across firms, though they do
not deal specifically with technology.
A performance standard allows polluters more freedom. Rather
than requiring a specific number of feet of setback or a specific casing
technology, for example, a performance standard might require that concentrations of specified pollutants in streams near drilling sites not exceed
a certain level or that a pressure test on the cement casing not exceed a
given reading. In theory, regulators can vary technology or performance
standards across regulated firms, though in practice they have tended to
implement uniform standards.
Command-and-control policy instruments are not all equal in economic terms. For example, performance standards are generally better than
technology standards at minimizing emissions control costs for a given
amount of abatement.45 Some performance standards are better than others
in effectiveness and cost-effectiveness terms.46 For reasons discussed in
Section 4, however, economic theory strongly favors market-based over
command-and-control policy instruments, even performance standards.
A recent analysis suggests that 81 percent of observed shale gas
regulations at the state level are prescriptive.47 Prescriptive approaches
are common at the federal level, as well. For example, the Bureau of Land
Management’s recent proposed rules for hydraulic fracturing on federal
lands require operators to maintain specific types of logs and meet particular well construction standards.48
Among these prescriptive approaches however, performance standards are practically nonexistent. Even when states do frame shalerelated regulations as performance standards, they often appear to be
unenforceable. In order to be effective, a performance standard must set
a well-defined, measurable standard. For example, requiring firms to limit
venting or flaring to circumstances where it is economically necessary or
HANDBOOK OF U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 553, 557 (Sheldon Kamieniecki & Michael E.
Kraft eds., 2012).
45
See David Besanko, Performance versus Design Standards in the Regulation of Pollution,
34 J. PUB. ECON. 19, 20, 43 (1987); Lori Bennear & Cary Coglianese, Flexible
Environmental Regulation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
582, 583, 587–88 (Sheldon Kamieniecki & Michael E. Kraft eds., 2012).
46
See Gloria E. Helfand, Standards versus Standards: The Effects of Different Pollution
Restrictions, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 622, 629, 633 (1991).
47
RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 14.
48
Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg. 31636
(proposed May 7, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160).
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to avoid such practices when they create a risk to public health does not
create an enforceable rule, though it might guide regulators’ case-by-case
permitting decisions. Conversely, a performance standard that effectively
precludes all but a single compliance mechanism is a performance standard in name only. The US Environmental Protection Agency established
updated New Source Performance Standards in 2012 for oil and gas
wells,49 though in practice these are structured so that a single technological approach, “green completion,” will be adequate to meet them.50
Setting these quasi-performance standards aside, out of 27 states
surveyed by Nathan Richardson and colleagues, only Alabama, Montana,
Nebraska, and Texas use performance standards, and none of them uses
a performance standard for more than one regulatory element in the
survey.51 Since these standards are so rare, drawing conclusions about
their rationale would be unwise.
Another even more flexible approach is case-by-case permitting,
under which operators must submit a formal permit application that is
subject to the regulator’s approval. Unlike performance standards, this
form of regulation is widely used for shale gas development activities,
accounting for 14% of regulations in the 27 states surveyed, and up to
20–25% of regulations in some individual states.52
Case-by-case permitting allows both operators and regulators some
discretion in the manner in which requirements are satisfied, but the level
of performance is not uniformly specified across firms. One benefit of this
approach is that operators and regulators can tailor their technologies and
practices to local conditions and priorities. It has important drawbacks,
however. It is administratively costly since each permit must be independently reviewed. It also frequently lacks transparency because it is difficult
for the industry, much less the interested public, to know what practices
and technologies are required.
III.

MARKET-BASED ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION (OF SHALE
GAS DEVELOPMENT)

By contrast to the prescriptive approaches described above, marketbased policy instruments are decentralized, focusing on aggregate or
49

Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49490 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63).
50
Id.
51
RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 15.
52
Id.
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market-level outcomes such as total emissions, rather than the activities
of individual facilities. A wide array of policy instruments falls within this
category: taxes, environmental markets (such as tradable pollution permit
programs), and information disclosure policies are common examples.
The principle that market-based instruments are more cost-effective
than command-and-control policies in the short run is well-developed in
economic theory.53 Market-based tools have this advantage because they
exploit cost differences across regulated firms. In the context of pollution
control, the firms with the lowest abatement costs exercise the most control, and those with the highest costs control less, paying more for permits
or higher tax bills. This short-run cost-effectiveness advantage tends to
be emphasized in public policy debates, and it is a critical argument in
favor of market-based instruments.
However, the greatest potential cost savings from these types of
environmental policies may be achieved in the long run, when firms’ compliance technologies are not fixed. Because they require firms to pay to
pollute, market-based tools provide strong incentives for regulated firms
to invest in new technologies that reduce pollution abatement costs over
time, either creating these innovative technologies themselves or adopting cheaper pollution control technologies developed by other firms.54
A.

Environmental Taxes

The classic economic prescription for the management of environmental market failures is to tax negative externalities and subsidize positive externalities, with the efficient tax, or subsidy, equal to the marginal
damages, or benefits, at the efficient level of the externality.55 To our
53

See Thomas D. Crocker, The Structuring of Atmospheric Pollution Control Systems, in
THE ECONOMICS OF AIR POLLUTION, 61, 63, 76–79 (H. Wolozin ed., 1966); Peter Bohm &
Clifford F. Russell, Comparative Analysis of Alternative Policy Instruments, in 1 HANDBOOK
OF NATURAL RESOURCE AND ENERGY ECONOMICS 395, 420–21, 441 (A.V. Kneese & J.L.
Sweeney eds., 1985); T.H. Tietenberg, Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation,
6 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 17, 17, 21, 23, 31 (1990); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins,
Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection: Integrating Theory and Practice, 82
AM. ECON. REV. 464, 464–65 (1992); Robert N. Stavins, Experience with Market-Based
Environmental Policy Instruments, in 1 HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 356,
359, 420–21 (Karl-Gören Mäler & Jeffrey R. Vincent eds., 2003).
54
See Paul B. Downing, & Lawrence J. White, Innovation in Pollution Control, 13 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 18, 19 (1986); Scott R. Milliman & Raymond Prince, Firm Incentives to Promote Technological Change in Pollution Control, 17 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 247, 247
(1989).
55
See generally A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 14 (4th ed. 1932); William J.
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knowledge, no taxes are used to regulate negative impacts of shale gas
development per se in the United States. But oil and gas production is
subject to many local, state, and federal taxes that potentially could be
used as tools to mitigate potential risks from shale gas development.
A severance tax is one candidate. While pollution taxes tend to be
charged on the flow of emissions from a particular source to air or water,
severance taxes are typically charged on the quantity or market value of
a nonrenewable natural resource stock removed from the environment.56
The severance tax is the most widely adopted state oil and gas tax.57
Twenty-six out of 31 states reviewed by Richardson et al.,58 currently
have severance taxes on natural gas (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. State Severance Taxes at $5.40/Mcf Natural Gas Price59

Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 307–08,
311 (1972); Agnar Sandmo, Optimal Taxation: An Introduction to the Literature, 6 J. PUB.
ECON. 37, 38, 50–51 (1975).
56
See UJJAYANT CHAKRAVORTY ET AL., STATE TAX POLICY AND OIL PRODUCTION: THE ROLE
OF THE SEVERANCE TAX AND CREDITS FOR DRILLING EXPENSES 6 (2009), available at
http://www .americantaxpolicyinstitute.org/pdf/energy_conference/chakravorty-gerkingleach.pdf.
57
Id.
58
RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 66–67.
59
RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 66, Map 21.
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State and local governments rely heavily on severance tax revenues to fund public goods.60 They may also be justified in theory as a way
to capture the intertemporal external cost related to the depletion of a
nonrenewable natural resource (“scarcity rent” in economic terms) in the
case of shale development. The fact is that a unit of gas removed from shale
today is not there to extract tomorrow. Private firms operating in competitive markets do internalize this cost as they make choices about how to
allocate their extraction activities over time.61 However, the public sector,
as owner of subsurface minerals in some instances and as steward of such
resources more generally, can capture and invest these rents to promote
the economically sustainable use of nonrenewable resources,62 remedy
environmental harms,63 or simply provide ongoing income that might
smooth the boom-and-bust cycle common to resource-based economies.
In theory, the optimal severance tax also could account for negative gas
production externalities to the extent that those externalities are related
to the quantity or value of production from a given well. Methane emissions and emissions of local and regional air pollutants, such as nitrogen
oxides (NOx) and volatile organic compounds, are good examples.
Unfortunately, severance taxes at current US levels appear to have
little impact on producer behavior. Recent analyses refute older studies
comparing state and federal oil and gas taxes in the 1990s that suggested
the severance tax had relatively strong impacts on production in comparison to the federal corporate income tax or state property taxes on oil and
gas reserves.64 The newer analyses account for tax interaction effects and
other complicating factors and show that production is quite inelastic to
even large changes in the severance tax, though they may have somewhat
more impact on drilling activity than on production.65
60

See Mitch Kunce, Effectiveness of Severance Tax Incentives in the U.S. Oil Industry, 10
INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 565, 565 (2003) [hereinafter Kunce, Effectiveness of Severance Tax
Incentives in the US Oil Industry].
61
See Harold Hotelling, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, 39 J. POL. ECON. 137,
164–67 (1931).
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See John M. Hartwick, Intergenerational Equity and the Investing of Rents from
Exhaustible Resources, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 972, 972–74 (1977); Robert Solow, Lecture at
the 40th Anniversary of Resources for the Future: An Almost Practical Step Toward
Sustainability (Oct. 8, 1992).
63
See David A. Gulley, Severance Taxes and Market Failure, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 597,
598–99 (1982).
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A second challenge is that the most significant potential risks related to shale gas development are not necessarily linked to producing
wells.66 In fact, once a shale gas well is in production, many risks from the
development process are no longer relevant. Local air pollution and congestion from truck traffic are good examples, as are surface water risks
from impoundments used for hydraulic fracturing. Other risks, such as
habitat fragmentation from well pads or pipelines, can no longer be affected
by a tax on production. Thus, a severance tax will not provide effective incentives on the margin for mitigation of these risks, though the revenues
could be used for corrective action or public investments in risk reduction.
In 2012, Pennsylvania chose a different option that may avoid these
two challenges. The state implemented an impact fee on gas production
from the Marcellus Shale, which counties or municipalities may vote to
adopt.67 The fee is imposed on every producer in adopting localities and
applies to all spudded unconventional gas wells. The amount of the fee
depends on the average annual price of natural gas and is charged on a
per-well basis, regardless of production.
The constitutionality of this fee is currently under review before
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,68 but to the extent that there are fixed
external costs to shale gas well development, the impact fee approach may
be economically justifiable. Such a fee could vary spatially. For example,
higher fees could be implemented in areas such as sensitive habitats that
have higher anticipated social costs of well development. Fees also could
increase over time as the land footprint of shale gas development consumes a greater fraction of formerly open space, increasing the marginal
value of remaining open space.
B.

Environmental Markets

While environmental taxation had been proposed since the early
part of the last century, the rise of environmental trading markets began
later, when the Nobel Prize–winning economist Ronald Coase noted that
the mere existence of externalities in a market could, under certain very
restrictive conditions, induce private negotiation of efficient outcomes in
Nonrenewable Resource Industries: Implications from the Wyoming Checkerboard, 80
LAND ECON. 76, 86, 90–91 (2004); CHAKRAVORTY ET AL., supra note 56, at 335–37.
66
See ALAN KRUPNICK ET AL., PATHWAYS TO DIALOGUE: WHAT THE EXPERTS SAY ABOUT
THE ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS OF SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT 4, 17, 20 (2013), available at
http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-Rpt-PathwaystoDialogue_FullReport.pdf.
67
Act of Feb. 14, 2014 (Act 13 of 2012), Pub. L. 87, No. 13 (codified as amended at 58 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 2302).
68
Robinson Twp., Washington Cnty. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
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cleaning up pollution.69 A key condition was well-defined property rights,
which fostered the development of systems of marketable pollution permits
known as “cap-and-trade” systems; although there are other variations
on the same theme.70 The conceptual framework of emissions trading programs is well-described in the literature.71 The regulator sets an aggregate
cap on pollution and allocates or auctions the implied number of pollution
permits to the regulated community.72 The pollution permits are transferable, and each firm will buy and sell permits based on a comparison of
market permit prices with its own marginal abatement costs.73 When the
permit market clears, each firm will have equated its own marginal pollution abatement cost with the prevailing permit price, resulting in equal
marginal costs across firms and the least-cost allocation of control responsibility to meet the aggregate cap.74
No emissions trading programs have been established specifically
to regulate risks from shale gas development, but current and future applications may be relevant, requiring or facilitating the participation of
energy developers directly or indirectly.
Shale gas operators and service companies are subject to Clean Air
Act regulations for local and regional air pollutants, some of which have
been implemented through tradable permit policies. For example, the
2003–2008 NOx Budget Trading Program was designed to reduce aggregate NOx emissions and their regional transport in the eastern United
States, in an effort to increase regional compliance with federal ambient
ozone standards.75 Marcellus shale development is expected to contribute
12% of regional NOx and volatile organic compound emissions responsible for the formation of ground-level ozone by 2020.76 If future trading
69

Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 41–44 (1960).
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/climate/how-cap-and-trade-works (last visited Oct. 27, 2014), archived at http://perma
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73
Id. at 93–94.
74
See Montgomery, supra note 70, at 401–03.
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programs were to emerge, sources in the shale gas production chain could
be incorporated, even though prior policies focused on coal-fired power
plants and other large industrial point sources.
Given the significant concerns raised about methane emissions in
the shale gas production chain,77 participation of shale gas operations in
existing markets for greenhouse gas emissions would seem to be an obvious candidate for extending the advantages of market-based regulation
to this new sphere. For example, one could imagine operators generating
emissions credits from green well completions that could be used as offsets
in existing markets, such as California’s new cap-and-trade program,78
or the European Union’s Emissions Trading System.79
If shale gas development is responsible for water pollution emissions in watersheds with water quality trading programs, operators may
be affected by these programs. The Clean Water Act prevents shale gas
operators from discharging effluent directly to rivers and streams, but
water quality trading policies could be relevant to shale gas development
in watersheds with Total Maximum Daily Loads (“TMDLs”) under the
Clean Water Act that focus on contaminants such as sediment, dissolved
solids, and chloride from both point and non-point sources.80 Links between shale gas development, sedimentation, and chloride in rivers and
streams have been established in the literature,81 and flowback and produced water are high in dissolved solids. Together, these contaminants
are the focus of ten to fifteen percent of TMDLs currently being implemented.82 A handful of current water quality trading programs allow
trading in sediment loads, but none focus on chloride or total dissolved
CA (Dec. 3–7, 2012), http://fallmeeting.agu.org/2012/eposters/eposter/gc23b-1069/, archived
at http://perma.cc/9WSE-23HM.
77
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solids.83 However, use of these flexible policy instruments could reduce the
cost of compliance with any new regulations addressing surface water
pollution from shale gas development.
Risks related to the quantity of water used in hydraulic fracturing
are an additional concern and are another area where markets could help.
These concerns are more relevant in arid regions than in those with a
more plentiful water supply.84 In some jurisdictions in the western United
States, water users have the ability to lease and transfer water rights to
other users.85 In theory, such markets can result in water moving to its
highest-valued uses.86
Because irrigation has traditionally dominated water consumption,
especially in the West, farmers stand to benefit most from the ability to engage shale gas operators—who need reliable sources of water for hydraulic fracturing—in leases or sales. If withdrawals for energy development
pose a risk to agriculture in arid states, water markets could help to mitigate that risk, compensating rights holders for any expected decreases in
productivity. Water leases and transfers between irrigators and growing
western cities may provide a template for such transactions with energy
developers.87 A small number of documented trades already have taken
place between agricultural users and energy developers in North Dakota;
Colorado and Utah also have seen some participation of energy developers
in water rights markets.88 Trading is likely occurring on a much larger
scale than what is implied by these documented instances, particularly
in states such as Texas, where groundwater is private property.89
For water users, the decision to transfer water depends on the relative impacts of development, the value of agricultural production with less
water, and the price that energy developers are willing to pay. While the

83

Karen A. Fisher-Vanden & Sheila M. Olmstead, Moving Pollution Trading from Air to
Water: Potential, Problems, and Prognosis, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 147, 151, 155 (2013).
84
Jean-Philippe Nicot & Bridget R. Scanlon, Water Use for Shale-Gas Production in Texas,
US, 46 ENVTL SCI. & TECH. 3580, 3580, 3585 (2012).
85
See Brandon Scarborough, Water Markets: Restoring Streams Through Trade, PERC
Policy Series No. 46, 2010, at 2.
86
L. M. HARTMAN & D. SEASTONE, WATER TRANSFERS: ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONS 7 (1970); Jedidiah Brewer et al., Water Markets in the West: Prices,
Trading, and Contractual Forms, 46 ECON. INQUIRY 91, 91–92 (2008).
87
See Brewer et al., supra note 86, at 91–92.
88
WESTERN GOVERNORS’ ASSOCIATION, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: PROJECTS, TRENDS
AND LEADING PRACTICES IN VOLUNTARY WATER TRADING 10, 88 (2012).
89
Water in Texas—Who Owns It?, TEXAS GROUNDWATER PROTECTION COMMITTEE (Sept. 12,
2014), http://www.tgpc.state.tx.us/subcommittees/POE/FAQs/WaterOwnership_FAQ.pdf.

2014]

MANAGING THE RISKS OF SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT

197

seller of water benefits from trade, other water users, such as those who
share infrastructure maintenance costs, may suffer unexpected consequences from water trading. Downstream junior rights holders who benefit
from irrigation return flows may also experience damages if water used for
hydraulic fracturing is not returned to rivers and streams, or if water quality is degraded. A careful examination of the distributional consequences
of water markets as they relate to shale gas development is needed.
C.

Information Disclosure Policies

Information disclosure policies have been developed to inform consumers about the public and private benefits of their consumption activities, as well as to influence the behavior of polluting firms. Policies aimed
at firms’ behavior are most relevant to the regulation of risks from shale
gas development, though such policies also can indirectly influence consumers of goods and services produced by these firms. There is growing
evidence for the effectiveness of such policies in changing firms’ behavior.90
An important example of this type of disclosure policy studied
by many researchers is the requirement that manufacturing facilities
publicly disclose toxic chemical releases under the US Toxics Release
Inventory (“TRI”) program.91 Though releases have decreased dramatically since the TRI began, it has been difficult to determine whether the
TRI is actually responsible for these decreases in toxic emissions because
data are not available for releases before the program began or for unregulated facilities.92
Federal and state legislators have implemented information disclosure requirements in an effort to mitigate shale gas development risks.
Since 2005, the injection of fracturing fluids other than diesel fuel has been
exempt from the disclosure requirements of the Safe Drinking Water Act,
the federal statute that typically addresses risks to drinking water
supplies from deep underground injection.93 However, the Bureau of Land
Management draft rules for hydraulic fracturing operations on public
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lands, issued in May 2012, include a fracking fluid disclosure requirement, and fifteen states currently require disclosure of this kind.94
Unfortunately, as with the TRI, no data are available on the contents of fracturing fluids before these state and federal policies came into
force, and because all hydraulic fracturing operations tend to be covered
by these rules, no data are available on fluids used by firms that do not
disclose their contents. Thus, it will be difficult to gauge the impact of
disclosure on operators’ behavior. A potential method is to exploit the variation in timing of the adoption of disclosure rules by states, controlling
carefully for other differences across states—perhaps looking at wells in
the same shale play but within states with different disclosure rules.
One possibility is that disclosure results in public attention to
operators using toxic chemicals, creating pressure for behavioral change
from consumers or shareholders. Such impacts have been measured empirically for the TRI, which is available online in an easy-to-interpret format.95
FracFocus has emerged to play a similar role for fracking fluid disclosure
requirements, and its website allows users to obtain PDFs of fracking
fluid chemical lists by well.96 Since disclosure through FracFocus has occurred for some locations since 2011, an empirical assessment of its effects on shareholder or consumer behavior may now be feasible. Similarly,
researchers could compare practices on federal land under the proposed
Bureau of Land Management disclosure rule97 to those on nearby private
land where disclosure is not required.
CONCLUSIONS
New regulation may be required to mitigate shale gas development
risks, most notably those with widespread associated harms. But for other
risks, small changes to the liability system may be simpler and more costeffective. When regulatory approaches are favored, market-based policies
can significantly reduce costs.
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The vast majority of existing regulations governing oil and gas
development are prescriptive. The most significant examples of marketbased approaches to risk mitigation thus far are water rights trading and
information disclosure regulations. Severance taxes are ubiquitous, but
in their current form, any impacts on environmental risk are probably
minimal. Air and water pollution trading programs under the Clean Air
Act and Clean Water Act may eventually be relevant to shale gas operations. If shale gas operators reduce methane emissions through green
completions, these activities could generate greenhouse gas abatement
credits that could, in theory, be used for compliance with climate-related
cap-and-trade policies.
A key research priority for understanding the potential for further
innovation in liability and market-based approaches to shale gas risk
mitigation is impact evaluation of those few innovative policies that have
already been implemented. What has been the effect on operator behavior of Pennsylvania’s shifting of the burden of proof regarding groundwater contamination near gas wells onto operators? How do the minimal
bonding and insurance requirements that are in place in various states
affect energy developers’ behavior, and what would be the impact of
increases in such requirements? Where energy developers are leasing and
purchasing water rights from farmers and other rights holders, what have
been the effects on water management costs, and on any affected third
parties? How has fracking fluid information disclosure affected shale gas
development practices?
Though theory offers substantial support for innovative approaches,
empirical evidence for their effectiveness and cost-effectiveness in practice
is essential.

